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CLOSE UP ON THE NEWS

1. The electoral prospects of Minshutô's (not so) new leadership

On May 16th, Hatoyama Yukio was elected to replace Ozawa Ichirô as leader of the Minshutô. Since March the party had been thinking of replacing the latter, to distract attention from its embroilment in the financial scandal as the elections approach. These include the elections for the Tokyo city council in July, and the general elections, the date of which is not yet known but which could be in August, although probably not before the second vote in the Lower House on six measures relating to the revised budget. This vote may take place on July 12th, at the end of the delay required by the Constitution. On June 3rd, the parliamentary session was extended by 45 days and is due to end on July 18th. As for the piracy bill passed by the Lower House on April 24th, it was given a second reading on June 24th¹.

The Minshutô has never been so close to taking
1 «Jimin shibomu 5 gatsu kaisan», *Yomiuri*, April 21st 2009, and «Jimin tsukinai tsûka ni zenryoku», *Yomiuri*, May 21st 2009.

power. Since the beginning of the year, it has had several successes in the local elections. Between 2007 and 2008, the number of its members and supporters rose from 20,000 to about 36,000².

The recent local election results³

October 19th 2008: mayoral election in Iruma (Saitama prefecture), won by Kinoshita Hiroshi, backed by the LDP and the Kômeitô.

November 16th: mayoral election in Utsunomiya (Tochigi prefecture), won by Satô Eiichi, backed by the LDP and the Kômeitô.

November 16th: mayoral election in Naha (Okinawa prefecture) won by Onaga Takeshi, backed by the LDP and the Kômeitô.

2 «Rô kumi izon, chihô no nayami», *Yomiuri*, April 24th 2009.

3 «Mini tôitsusen he, eikyôwa?», *Yomiuri*, March 27th 2009, and «Mini tôitsu chihô sen, yoyatô funa wa bunretsu», *Yomiuri*, April 14th 2009.

November 30th: mayoral election in Chiryû (Aichi prefecture) won by Hayashi Ikuo, backed by the Minshutô.

December 21st: mayoral election in Yaizu (Shizuoka prefecture) won by Shimizu Hiroshi, backed by the Minshutô.

December 21st: mayoral election in Kitami (Hokkaidô) won by Kotani Tsunehiko, backed by the Minshutô and the Social-Democratic Party.

February 8th 2009: mayoral election in Nishi-Tôkyô (Tôkyô prefecture) won by Sakaguchi Kôji, backed by the Minshutô, the Social-Democratic Party, and the Communists.

February 8th: mayoral election in Fukutsu (Fukuoka prefecture) won by Koyama Tatsuo, backed by the LDP and the Kômeitô.

March 1st: mayoral election in Yanai (Yamaguchi), won by Ihara Kentarô, backed by the Minshutô.

March 29th: election in Chiba for the prefecture governorship, won by Kensaku Morita, an independent candidate backed by half of the LDP members of the prefectural assembly.

April 5th: mayoral election in Kodaira (Tôkyô prefecture), won by Kobayashi Masanori, backed by the Minshutô, the Communists, and the New People's Party.

April 12th: election in Akita for the prefecture governorship, won by Satake Norihisa, backed by the LDP, the social democrats, and Rengô (despite his links with the local branch of the Minshutô).

April 12th: mayoral election in Yuzawa (Akita prefecture), won by Saitô Mitsuyoshi, backed by the LDP and the Kômeitô.

April 12th: mayoral election in Yurihonjô (Akita prefecture), won by Yanagida Hiroshi, backed by the Minshutô.

April 26th: mayoral election in Nagoya, won by Kawamura Takashi, backed by the Minshutô.

May 24th: mayoral election in Saitama, won by Shimizu Hayato, backed by the Minshutô.

June 14th: mayoral election in Chiba, won by Kumagai Toshihito, backed by the Minshutô.

July 5th: governorship election in Shizuoka, won by Kawakatsu Heita, backed by the Minshutô, the Social Democratic Party, and the New People's Party.

July 12th: Prefectural elections for the Tôkyô Metropolitan Assembly, won by Minshutô

At the end of March, according to the opinion polls, the electorate's intentions to vote either for the Minshutô or the LDP were evenly divided (31% each, according to a Yomiuri poll). Among those with no definite partisan views, voting intentions were more favourable to the Minshutô than to the LDP (24% against 12%), although the gap had narrowed in comparison with the beginning of the year, when the voting intentions in favour of the Minshutô in this category had been above 30%.⁴

Ozawa's growing unpopularity was compromising the party's prospects, and Hatoyama's victory was welcomed by the electorate, but without great enthusiasm. A poll conducted after that ballot showed two things: 4 «Mutôha, minshu ni fuman», *Yomiuri*, March 27th 2009.

that Hatoyama was considered to be potentially a better Prime Minister than Asô (42% against 32%; a bit earlier Ozawa received only a 25% approval rating against 40% for Asô), and that a majority of the respondents (53% against 40%) had low expectations of Hatoyama.⁵

A brief history of the Minshutô⁶

April 1998: The Minshutô is set up. The first Chairman is Kan Naoto, with Hata Tsutomu as General Secretary. Kan is re-elected to the chairmanship by 180 votes against 51 for Matsuzawa.

September 1999: Hatoyama Yukio is elected as Chairman, taking 154 votes against 109 for Kan and 57 for Yokomichi in the first round, and 182 votes against 130 for Kan in the second.

September 2002: Hatoyama is re-elected as Chairman for a third term, taking 294 votes in the first round, against 221 for Kan, 182 for Noda, and 119 for Yokomichi; in the second round he wins with 254 votes against 242 for Kan.

December 2002: Kan Naoto is elected as Chairman, with 104 votes against 79 for Okada Katsuya, who becomes General Secretary.

September 2003: Merger with Ozawa Ichirô's Liberal Party.

May 2004: Kan resigns over the pensions scandal (many politicians did not make proper contributions when they occupied ministerial posts). He is replaced by Okada Katsuya who

is reappointed without a vote in September 2004. Fuji Hirohisa becomes General Secretary.

September 2005: Okada resigns after defeat in the elections to the House of Representatives. He is replaced by Maehara Seiji (gaining 96 votes against 94 for Kan). Hatoyama Yukio becomes General Secretary.

March 2006: Maehara Seiji accuses the son of Takebe Tsutomu, the LDP General Secretary, of having links with Horie Takafumi, managing director of Livedoor, charged with fraud at the time and later found guilty. By way of proof, he waves an alleged e-mail from Horie, invoicing Mr. Takebe's son for 30 million yen (250,000 euros) in consultancy fees. The e-mail turns out to be a fake, and Maehara resigns.

April 2006: Ozawa Ichirô is elected by 119 votes against 72 for Kan, whom he replaces.

July 2007: The Democratic Party becomes the majority party in the Upper House.

May 2008: Ozawa's secretary is suspected of fraud and Ozawa resigns. On May 16th Hatoyama Yukio takes his place, and Okada Katsuya is appointed as General Secretary.

Mr. Hatoyama gained 124 votes against 95 for Mr. Okada (only representatives and councillors were called upon to vote). Mr. Hatoyama is a member of one of those political dynasties which have dominated Japanese politics since the 19th century. His father was Minister of Foreign Affairs, and his brother was Minister of the Interior under the Asô government.⁷

⁵ «Hatoyama daihyô kitaisezu 53%», *Yomiuri*, May 18th 2009.

⁶ Based on «Seron yori tōnai ryokugaku» («Minshutô no ayumi»), *Yomiuri*, May 17th 2009, and «Hageshii shūhyō gōsen» («Senkyosen to natta kako no minshutô daihyōsen»), *Yomiuri*, May 16th 2009.

⁷ He resigned from his post on June 12th, having opposed the Prime Minister over the reappointment of Nishikawa Yoshifumi to head the Japan Post, the latter having been appointed by Mr. Koizumi.

Hatoyama's choice of Mr. Okada, his unsuccessful opponent, for the post of General Secretary is a further break with this tradition of political inheritance.

Mr. Okada, who is 55 and a former graduate of the law faculty at Tôkyô university, has a good reputation. As the Chairman of his party, he resigned immediately after its poor performance in the 2005 election. Although he is respected, he does not benefit from the same sources of support as Mr. Hatoyama: his «faction» (although officially there are no factions in the Democratic Party) has fewer members. His family runs the Aeon group, which owns the Ministop chain and manages the Laura Ashley and Body Shop stores in Japan. His brother is the managing director of Aeon.

The groups within the Minshutô (on April 16th 2009)

Ozawa Ichirô - 50 members

Hayoyama Yukio - 30 members

Kan Naoto - 30 members

Maehara Seiji - 30 members

Noda Yoshihiko - 20 members

The group from the former Socialist Party (led by Yokomichi Takahiro, and including such figures as Koshiishi Azuma, chairman of the party committee for issues related to the House of Councillors) - 20 members

The group from the former Social Democratic Party (with Naoshima Masayuki, chairman of the Minshutô political affairs committee) - 20 members

Hiraoka Hideo and Kondô Shôichi - 15 members

Additional sources: Yakami Masayuki's site, zengikai no saito (<http://gikai.fc2web.com/index.htm>).

2. The repercussions of the North Korean crisis

The North Korean crisis has had further repercussions with the launching of a missile on April 5th (the US information agencies established that the three stages had separated and that nothing was put into orbit), and a new nuclear test on May 25th (twenty times more powerful than the test in October 2006, but still quite small).

The Japanese Defence ministry gave the order to intercept any missile threatening Japan, which could have been a baptism of fire for the Japanese-American antimissile system. North Korea announced that it would consider such an act as a declaration of war. The missile passed over northern Honshû and the Self-Defence Forces (satellites now being able to support national defence objectives) lost track of it around 2,100 kilometres further out. Following this, South Korea announced that it was rejoining the anti-proliferation initiative adopted on the basis of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and linking 90 States in a multilateral collaboration against proliferation.

China and Russia were not in favour of passing a new resolution condemning the «satellite» launch. Instead, a declaration from the Security Council's president condemning Korea was approved by a meeting of its members.

For its part, Japan decided to reinforce the

sanctions adopted in 2006, which have been renewed every six months, prohibit North Korean vessels from entering from Japanese ports and ban the import of North Korean products into Japan. From now on, these measures will be renewed annually. Japan also lowered the threshold permitting financial transfers to North Korea without government clearance, from 30 million yen (about 200,000 euros) to 10 million yen. Individuals travelling to North Korea will now be allowed to take only 300,000 yen, not the previously permitted 1 million yen. Finally, all Japanese exports to Korea are completely banned (since 2006, only exports capable of helping the North Korean AMD programme had been forbidden). This latter measure will remain in force until April 13th 2010.⁸

After this new test by North Korea, which it defended as a measured response to South Korea's decision to join the UN Security Council anti-proliferation initiative, the Security Council held a debate which lasted two weeks before adopting a resolution on June 12th condemning the test «in the strongest possible terms».⁹ Resolution 1874 (2009), passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, restated the obligations imposed under Resolution 1718 (2006), and added to them exchange control measures and inspections at sea.

The Minshutô has said that it is ready to co-operate with the LDP to pass a law imposing new sanctions on the basis of this resolution.¹⁰ Under the current legal provisions in Japan, the Self-Defence Forces (SDF) can only conduct maritime inspections in Japanese territorial waters, in accordance with the maritime law covering foreign vessels or any ships on the

8 «Taikita kinyû kyô kakugi kettei», *Yomiuri*, June 16th 2009.

9 Resolution 1874 (2009).

10 «Kitaseisai hô seibi minshu mo kyôryoku», *Yomiuri*, June 14th 2009.

high seas, except when the government declares the situation to be one of a «crisis in the immediate vicinity» in accordance with the law on naval inspections. In addition, if Japan has come under attack, the SDF may conduct full naval inspections under the provisions of the law on the maritime transport of foreign weapons at times of armed aggression. But the Japanese government considered that the nuclear test did not constitute a “crisis in the vicinity of Japan”, and that Japan was not under attack. Consequently the government needs either to propose a new law or to amend the current one on inspections at sea.¹¹ A bill to this effect was put before the Diet on June 18th¹². The bill allows the coastguards, like the SDF, to search vessels in the coastal waters or on the open seas surrounding Japan, when instructed to do so by the Prime Minister. However, the consent of the country whose flag is flown by the vessel is required in advance, as well as the agreement of the captain.

In addition to this, on June 26th a working group from the LDP and the Kômeitô proposed a special law based on Resolution 1874, which would allow the coastguards and the maritime SDF to inspect any ships approaching or leaving North Korea, if they were suspected of smuggling arms. The inspections would be carried out mainly by the coastguards, while the SDF would be charged with following the suspect vessels and gathering information on them. The SDF would be able to inspect heavily armed vessels.

11 «Kita no senkensa, hôseibi ni iyoku», *Yomiuri*, June 9th 2009.

12 A bill (Kitachôsen tokutei kabutsu no kensa ni kansuru tokubetsu sochi hôan) based on those propositions was voted by the Lower House on July 14th, but could not be passed before the end of the session.

The North Korean Crisis

March 12th 1993: North Korea denounces the Non-Proliferation Treaty (it withdraws this denunciation before the end of the deadline)

October 21st 1994: signature of an agreement between North Korea and the United States

August 31st 1998: North Korea launches a Taepodong rocket which overflies Japan

August 27th-29th 2003: first meeting of the Six-Party Talks

September 19th 2005: first agreement between the six parties to the talks

July 5th 2006: North Korea launches a Taepodong 2 which does not complete its trajectory

October 9th 2006: first nuclear test (very low yield, probably a failure)

October 14th 2006: adoption of Security Council Resolution 1718

October 11th 2008: the United States takes North Korea off its list of terrorist states

December 11th 2008: a new session of the Six-Party Talks ends in failure

February 24th 2009: North Korea announces that it is preparing to put a satellite into orbit

April 5th: North Korea launches a missile (according to US information agencies, probably a Taepodong 2)

April 13th: the Security Council approves a condemnation by its Chairman of North Korea's missile launch

May 25th 2009: North Korea conducts a new test (likewise, low yield)

Additional sources: the Nikkei, the Ministry of Justice (Kokkai teishutsu hōan: <http://www.moj.go.jp/HOUAN/index.html>), the Diet (http://www.shugiin.go.jp/index.nsf/html/index_gian.htm).

POINTS OF NEWS

Kitaoka Shin'ichi. «The end of the Tanaka style of politics and the new direction» [Tanakaha seiji no shūen to atarashii chūdō he no michi], *Chūō kōron*, May 2009.

Tōkyō University Professor Kitaoka Shin'ichi outlines the path which the Japanese politicians and people should follow in the run-up to the coming elections.

In 1955, when the Liberal Democrat Party came into being, one of the architects of the conservative alliance said that it would «last a good ten years». Over half a century later, the LDP continues in power, having only experienced a sort year's interruption after August 1993. If the LDP has been able to remain in power for so long, it is because it represents a response to a reality in Japanese life. In the conditions of the Cold War, it made a clear choice for the West. In the immediate post-war period, it had opted for the market economy at a time when there was a trend, beyond ranks of the socialists themselves, in favour of a planned economy. The population had had enough of war, and desired prosperity. The LDP matched that desire.

Japan in the Cold War period was intellectually fragmented. Free-traders coexisted with socialist and pacifist sympathisers (believing that peace should only be sought by peaceful means). This was reflected in the Diet, where the LDP appeared as the party of realism, as opposed to the socialists, who were called idealists but who, with regard to ideals, were above all lacking in ideas. But, because they represented a third of the electorate, they were able to block important reforms like the revision of the Constitution.

Within the conservative tendency, there were several different preferences. For the sake of national reconstruction, Yoshida Shigeru wanted to focus every effort on the economy and tended to be pro-American. Alongside his supporters there was a camp in favour of giving expression to Japanese independence from the United States. This camp gained in strength with the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and, in the following year, the rehabilitation of Hatoyama Ichirô, who had been barred from holding public office. From the outset, the LDP which was born from the fusion of these two trends, was set on adopting a new Constitution. In the 1950s, Hatoyama Ichirô took power, followed by Kishi Nobusuke, and they too wished for a new Constitution. But after the government of Ikeda Hayato, greater attention was given to the economy, and the question of revising the Constitution was set aside. Like its support base, which is mostly to be found in the non-urban constituencies, the LDP follows a course of pragmatism and stability.

The LDP's policy of «reacting pragmatically» remained viable until the 1970s. While Kishi Nobusuke was establishing our relations with Asia, he made Japanese-American relations a central pillar of Japanese diplomacy and put all his efforts into replacing the 1951 security treaty with the 1960 version. Ikeda Hayato focused

on the economy and Satô Eisaku managed to secure the return of Okinawa under nuclear arrangements «covering the rest of Japan».

After that, the LDP achieved nothing as significant as the signing of the new security treaty or the return of Okinawa. The media were wrong to talk of a virtual «conservative revolution» at a time when no real changes were taking place. After 1983, when Nakasone Yasuhiro joined up with the Liberal New Club, coalition governments simply succeeded each other with the LDP at their centre, with the consequence that the political line changed very little. Since, despite that fact, the media made it appear that great changes were taking place, the population forgot that by voting it could radically change the political direction. Amidst this lack of real change, people (and the media in particular) began to expect politicians to resign for trivial reasons. At a time when Prime Ministers representing the majority in the Lower House, should not have had to resign before elections were due, several of them did actually resign on such grounds as that the number of seats held by their party in the Upper House had fallen, or that some local elections had been lost, or even that their popularity ratings were low.

In this way politics was reduced to «a politics of minor adjustments». It was unable to settle structural problems and only effected changes of secondary importance. So, most of the major problems which we are facing today - the birth rate, education, agriculture - go back to the 1970s. A politics of minor changes is always in the hands of the civil service, whose role is to operate within the continuity of everything done up until then. By definition, it is not in itself a force for reform.

From the 1970s onwards, Japanese politics entered upon an era marked especially by the influence of Tanaka Kakuei, for whom every

problem, at home or abroad, could be solved by money. This approach proved quite effective for as long as the growth of the economy allowed, but in the 1990s, with the bursting of the bubble and the economic recession (more than the split in the Tanaka faction) the system no longer worked. The three political tendencies began to engage in intense struggles with each other, with the right wing around Kishi (a trend currently continued by Seiwakai under Machimura Nobutaka), the left around Ikeda (currently continued by Kôchikai under Koga Makoto), and the centre around Satô and Tanaka (continued nowadays by Heiseiken under Tsushima Yûji). Naturally, the centre frequently managed to stay in power. It often formed an alliance with the Ikeda faction for pragmatic reasons in the interests of whatever proved advantageous to it.

The fact that four Prime Ministers over eight years belonged to the Seiwakai faction, in a party which used to rotate governmental positions between its factions, is sufficiently revealing of the broad rejection of the practices established by the Tanaka faction. In the diplomatic field, the same change can be observed: it was the framework of the Cold War created by the United States, which had permitted diplomatic issues to be settled financially. But now such practices, which typified the Tanaka faction, are no longer sufficient to satisfy the demand that Japan should contribute to international security.

The Nishimatsu affair (in which Mr. Ozawa was implicated) raises the question as to whether the «Tanaka-style» politics has disappeared or not. My answer is that it has not completely disappeared, but it is practiced more discreetly.

(...) In the 1990s, the collapse of the Socialist Party dragged down with it the «1955 system» [1955 being the year when when the two major

parties, socialist and conservative, were born]. Can the «1946 system» now be reformed? That system, starting with the Constitution, was set up in order to contain Japan. Its significance changed during the Cold War, and that altered situation has continued. But it is not workable. Article 9 is not the only issue. For example, the fact that the two Houses have practically identical powers is the reason for our current stalemates. The Constitution needs to be revised so that the majority required in the Lower House on its second reading vote no longer be two thirds, but a simple majority. The Japanese now find themselves pushed into dangerous situations where they can only use their weapons as a cosmetic cover.

Abe Shinzô has spoken about «getting out of the 1946 regime». Two of his predecessors, Ôhira Masayoshi and Nakasone Yasuhiro, said the same before him, and called upon «drawing up a post-war political reckoning».

Nowadays, whichever figure enjoys popularity at the time of the elections becomes the Prime Minister. So the factions have become like shifting sands, bereft of their ideological contents and their competitive aspect.

Mr. Abe had no brains, or if he did have any, they were unfortunately taken up entirely by his wish to bring about the rebirth of Japan as it was before the Second World War. Two questions are now posed to Japanese politicians: Should Japan's role in the last war be admitted or denied? And should we play an active role in international co-operation or not?

The socialists renounce the Japan of the Second World War and are also reluctant to participate in international co-operation. Some people do not renounce wartime Japan while also having little interest in international co-operation: they are the nostalgics, looking for a return to pre-war

Japan. Very few people identify with the image of pre-war Japan while also being in favour of international co-operation, since those who consider that Japan was not an aggressor take no interest in such matters.

There is a last group, consisting of those who reject wartime Japan and want more international co-operation. In my view they represent the new middle way. Nakasone, Hosokawa, Ozawa, and most people belong to this group. Japan's future lies in its increasing strength. There is a danger in maintaining too close relations with the nostalgics in order to support the perspectives of the «middle way»: leaving the 1946 regime behind should not mean wishing to restore the pre-war regime. But this ambiguity has had some favourable aspects. Like other supporters of the «middle way», I share with the nostalgics the view that we should take a stronger stand towards the United States, that we should revise the Constitution, and that the Tôkyô international tribunal had many defects. But pre-war Shôwa Japan, particularly after the Sino-Japanese war of 1937, was impoverished and without freedom; as a militarist and expansionist State, it was the cause of problems. It is also impossible to sustain the historical argument that Japan did not annex its neighbours. In the face of the worsening international situation around Japan, the «middle way» in favour of international security measures has become indispensable. Until now, the people have relied for this on the LDP and they in turn have relied on the United States, which was their biggest mistake. The time is coming when the people will be able to face up to their responsibilities and make a decision.



Gabe Masaaki,¹³ Maeda Tetsuo¹⁴, Kamaki Kazuhiko¹⁵, and Koseki Shôichi¹⁶, «Re-thinking the policy on national security» [Anzenhoshô seisaku no aruterunatibu], *Sekai*, July 2009, pp. 106-122.

The authors protest against the Japanese-American agreement of May 13th 2009, which provides for the deployment of around 7,000 marines and the settlement of their families on Guam. They call for a new direction in Japanese diplomacy over defence matters.

May 13th 2009 saw the ratification of the agreement signed by the new Obama administration and the Japanese government, providing for sharing the costs of transferring of some of the marines based on Okinawa to Guam. The Lower House voted in favour of ratification on April 14th, the Upper House rejected it on May 13th, and the ratification went through on a second reading of the Lower House in accordance with article 61 of the Constitution. It came into force on May 19th, through an exchange of notes between the two governments. It carries no expiry date.

This agreement lays down the concrete arrangements for the transfer, in accordance with the agreement of October 29th 2005 (the Japanese-American Alliance: changing and transforming for the future) and the route map of May 1st 2006. But why was there an agreement on the specific issue of relocating the marines to Guam? To understand this, it is necessary to take a look at the difficulties posed by these agreements.

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The route map claimed to reduce the burden of the bases on Okinawa; but in fact this burden is practically unchanged, and is even being perpetuated. This route map has two characteristics.

Firstly it links the different questions together. In fact, the proposed transformation covers simultaneously the marine base, Zama (Kanagawa), where the army headquarters are located, the Yokota base (Tôkyô) and its surrounding air space, along with the relocation of the aircraft carrier from Atsugi (Kanagawa) to Iwakuni (Yamaguchi), the anti-missile defence system, and the site of military exercises. For Okinawa this means the relocation from Futenma to some other site in the department, the building of military installations on Guam, and the relocation of the bases south of Kadena to the interior of the department, which are all to be carried out together in order to avoid any possible gaps.

The route map then specifies Japan's participation in the transfer to Guam. [In this respect it is finalised by the May 19th agreement which sets Japan's monetary contribution at 2.8 billion dollars].

This agreement is inequitable. Firstly, what the parties have come to agreement over is the articles themselves; for its part, the preamble «recognises» the obligations arising from the route map. [This preamble mentions the overall balance sheet of the route map: Japan will contribute \$6,090 billion out of the total cost of \$10,270 billion for the transfer to Guam, while the remainder amounting to \$4 billion or so will be borne by the United States]¹⁷. Article 1 of the agreement states that Japan will provide \$2.8 billion; article 2 provides that the United States will proceed to the relocation and development of infrastructures [depending, according to 17 In brackets are comments from the editor.

article 3, on the level of progress achieved by the Japanese government in relocating from Futenma, since the different aspects of the transformation are linked]. In concrete terms, then, the American government is not committed to anything.

Moreover, points 1 and 2 of article 9 lay down the conditions for the payment of the Japanese and the American contributions respectively. The Japanese payments are made the prior condition for American investments, which are in turn dependent on 1) the availability of funds for the relocation, 2) Japan's progress in relation to Futenma, 3) Japan's respect for its financial obligations as laid down in the route map. There is not a cent committed on the American side.¹⁸

(...) We must stop displaying such servility towards the United States, and to do that we must give up or change everything which has given rise to such servility:

1. From being centred, as it was, on Japan, the Alliance must open up to the world and move away from the culture of secrecy which has marked it up until now. For example, the contents of the discussions within the 2+2 committees are rarely made public.

2. We must decide on new Japanese-American directives and reconsider our military deployments overseas. The operations in the Indian Ocean and Somalia must be suspended. The elections must allow the will of the people to be expressed. We have seen examples of military withdrawals following elections during the Iraq war (2003), and the United States did not exact reprisals against the countries concerned.

¹⁸ However, the US may not make use of the Japanese contribution to finance installations on Guam (article 4), and the two governments are to agree annually over the concrete projects to be developed (article 7).

3. Finally, we need a new diplomatic approach to Asia; to propose an Asian security community, to sign an Asian denuclearisation treaty, or a treaty on maritime co-operation in Asia.



Okada Katsuya «Devising a 'Japan in Asia' policy on national security» [«Ajia no naka no nihon» toshite anzenhoshô seisaku wo kôchiku shinakereba naranai], *Sekai*, July 2009, pp. 138-143

Okada Katsuya, the former Chairmon of the Democratic Party, stood against Hatoyama Yukio in the last elections. When the latter was elected, he nominated the former as vice-Chairman. Considered to be honest, he enjoys a good reputation and is widely believed to be a future leading figure.

You are very committed to disarmament, and the Minshutô's parliamentary league for promoting nuclear disarmament, under your chairmanship, has recently drawn up a plan for a regional treaty for the denuclearisation of Asia. In Prague on April 5th, Mr. Obama declared that «we must free the world from nuclear arms» and that the United States, as the world's leading nuclear power, needs to set an example with regard to disarmament.

The Indian and Pakistani nuclear programmes marked an about-turn with regard to disarmament. Subsequently, the Non-Proliferation Treaty suffered a setback from the North Korean and Iranian programmes. Furthermore Mr. Bush came out in favour of the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons and opposed the nuclear test ban treaty. But disarmament now seems to be enjoying a new springtime. Mr. Obama has declared that he

would open negotiations with Russia before next December's expiry of the START 1 treaty signed in 1991. Kissinger, Nunn, Perry, and Schultz¹⁹ have also called for an end to nuclear weapons, and this has been interpreted as signalling an American change of heart on the matter. Mr. Obama stands for an extension of this trend.

While it welcomes this American initiative and affirms its wishes to join in, the Japanese government has indicated on several occasions that the deterrent power of the United States should not be diminished.

Yesterday, in front of the financial committee, Mr. Asô stated that Mr. Obama's declaration would be among those which most marked his term in office. For my part, I said that I found the position of our Foreign Minister rather odd, when he said that the renunciation of the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons diminished the deterrent force of the American nuclear umbrella, and that it was a cause for concern. This means that the speech by the Prime Minister has no real substance.

The Japanese government also stands for disarmament and the fight against proliferation, but in practice all that it does is put down motions in the General Assembly. That has its importance, but it hardly lets us present ourselves as the fervent defenders of these objectives. We never attempted to offer advice in order to modify Mr. Bush's policies; and now we are sticking to the line put forward by Mr. Obama. In short, we do nothing but follow the United States.

Disarmament and non-proliferation must become the pillars of Japanese diplomacy. For that, we need new ideas. Japan must insist on 19 George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, «Toward a Nuclear-Free World», *Wall Street Journal*, January 15th 2009.

three points: firstly, that the nuclear States should give up the right of first strike, secondly, that they should give up the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States, and finally, Japan should propose the denuclearisation of East Asia.

When Japan criticised India's nuclear test, India retorted that Japan had no right to criticise, since it benefited from the American nuclear umbrella. There is a huge contradiction between Japan's position as the only victim of an atomic attack, which should put it at the forefront of the moves to abolish such weapons, and the priority which it gives to the American nuclear umbrella.

An American renunciation of a nuclear first strike would not mean that we were no longer under the protection of the US umbrella. Indeed, to lose that protection as long as nuclear weapons still exist in the world would be worrying. But the renunciation of the right of first strike does not mean giving up all rights of retaliation against a nuclear attack.

The North Korean nuclear and ballistic programmes are presented as a threat to Japan. On April 5th it conducted a missile test, and on May 25th another nuclear test. Faced with this, some people in Japan have started talking about a pre-emptive strike or a strike against enemy bases. But isn't the denuclearisation of Asia and alternative?

Our population feels threatened by North Korea. But in the face of North Korea's nuclear arsenal, I do not believe that we need the nuclear umbrella. In my opinion, conventional weapons would allow sufficient retaliation. What the adherents to the nuclear umbrella thesis really have in mind is China's nuclear arsenal.

North Korea's abandonment of its nuclear programme is a necessary precondition for the signing of a regional denuclearisation treaty, but what is lacking in current initiatives is a vision of the next phase, when Korea has given up its programme. Korea must give up its weapon and the United States and China must give up their use.²⁰

20 China has stated that it will not resort to a nuclear first strike or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States (Note from the editor)

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